Fairness in round-robin tournaments with four players and endogenous sequences
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More about this item
Keywords
Sequential Round-Robin Tournament; Endogenous Sequence; Contest Success Function; Multiple Prizes; Fairness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-08-26 (Economic Design)
- NEP-SPO-2024-08-26 (Sports and Economics)
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