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Grenzabschöpfungsraten im deutschen Finanzausgleich

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  • Burret, Heiko Tobias
  • Bury, Yannick
  • Feld, Lars P.

Abstract

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Grenzabschöpfungsraten des deutschen Finanzausgleichs für die Länder seit dem Jahr 1970 erstmals unter Berücksichtigung aller ihrer ausgleichsrelevanten Einnahmen berechnet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen die Effekte der Reformen der Finanzverfassung im Zeitverlauf auf die Grenzabschöpfung, insbesondere die Effekte des jeweils gewählten Ausgleichtarifs und des im Jahr 2005 eingeführten Prämienmodells. Insgesamt liegen die Grenzabschöpfungsraten durchgehend auf einem hohen Niveau, das vor allem bei den Nehmerländern an eine Vollabschöpfung zusätzlicher Steuereinnahmen heranreicht. Während die Diskussion um die Wirkungsweise der Grenzabschöpfungsraten auf das (Fiskal-)Verhalten der Landespolitik bisher im Wesentlichen auf theoretischen Überlegungen basiert, liefert der Beitrag eine geeignete Datengrundlage, um die (Fehl-)Anreize der Grenzabschöpfungsraten einer empirischen Überprüfung zu unterziehen.

Suggested Citation

  • Burret, Heiko Tobias & Bury, Yannick & Feld, Lars P., 2018. "Grenzabschöpfungsraten im deutschen Finanzausgleich," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 18/04, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:1804
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    Cited by:

    1. Yannick Bury & Lars P. Feld & Heiko T. Burret, 2024. "Skimming the achieved? Quantifying the fiscal incentives of the German fiscal equalization scheme and its reforms since 1970," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 291-334, September.
    2. Burret, Heiko T. & Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2022. "Fiscal federalism and economic performance new evidence from Switzerland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Scherf, Wolfgang, 2020. "Grenzbelastungen im Länderfinanzausgleich," Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere 103, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften.

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