IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_11293.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Skimming the Achieved? ⸻ Quantifying the Fiscal Incentives of the German Fiscal Equalization Scheme and Its Reforms since 1970

Author

Listed:
  • Yannick Bury
  • Lars P. Feld
  • Heiko T. Burret

Abstract

Marginal rates of contribution (MRC), i.e., the rates at which additional revenues are skimmed via larger contributions or lower transfer receipts, quantify the incentives of a fiscal equalization scheme. The present paper is the first to calculate marginal rates of contribution for the Laender (states) in the German fiscal equalization scheme for each of the 51 years since its establishment in 1970 and over five major reforms, taking into account all relevant revenues. Our results show that MRC have been at a consistently high level. Until 2019 the scheme induced an almost full skimming of additional tax revenues of recipient states. With the system’s latest reform in 2020, MRC increased further. Recipient states now face an over-skimming of additional tax revenues and thus, massive fiscal disincentives to maintain their own tax base. While these findings have been widely expected, comprehensive evidence has been missing so far.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannick Bury & Lars P. Feld & Heiko T. Burret, 2024. "Skimming the Achieved? ⸻ Quantifying the Fiscal Incentives of the German Fiscal Equalization Scheme and Its Reforms since 1970," CESifo Working Paper Series 11293, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11293
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11293.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach & Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2013. "Creative Destruction and Fiscal Institutions: A Long-Run Case Study of Three Regions," Economic Complexity and Evolution, in: Guido Buenstorf & Uwe Cantner & Horst Hanusch & Michael Hutter & Hans-Walter Lorenz & Fritz Rahmeyer (ed.), The Two Sides of Innovation, edition 127, pages 187-207, Springer.
    2. Bönke Timm & Schröder Carsten & Jochimsen Beate, 2017. "Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 377-409, August.
    3. Feld, Lars P. & Fuest, Clemens & Haucap, Justus & Wieland, Volker & Wigger, Berthold U., 2016. "Für eine echte Reform der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen," Kronberger Kreis-Studien 62, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    4. Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, January.
    5. Christian Baretti & Bernd Huber & Karl Lichtblau, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(6), pages 631-649, November.
    6. Egger, Peter & Koethenbuerger, Marko & Smart, Michael, 2010. "Do fiscal transfers alleviate business tax competition? Evidence from Germany," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 235-246, April.
    7. Marko Köthenbürger, 2002. "Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 391-408, August.
    8. Hauptmeier, Sebastian, 2007. "The Impact of Fiscal Equalization on Local Expenditure Policies: Theory and Evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-081, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Hentze, Tobias, 2015. "Länderfinanzausgleich: Eine Bewertung aktueller Vorschläge zur Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzen," IW policy papers 29/2015, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.
    10. Hauptmeier, Sebastian, 2009. "Fiscal Competition and the Impact of Fiscal Equalisation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 9691, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Baretti, Christian & Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," Munich Reprints in Economics 20129, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Scherf, Wolfgang, 2007. "Grenzbelastungen im Länderfinanzausgleich," Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere 79, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Burret, Heiko Tobias & Bury, Yannick & Feld, Lars P., 2018. "Grenzabschöpfungsraten im deutschen Finanzausgleich," Working Papers 02/2018, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    2. Krause, Manuela & Büttner, Thiess, 2017. "Does Fiscal Equalization Lead to Higher Tax Rates? Empirical Evidence from Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168214, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010. "Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 683-703, May.
    4. Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger & Michael Smart, 2010. "Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany," Working Papers 2010/44, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. Yongzheng Liu, 2014. "Does competition for capital discipline governments? The role of fiscal equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(3), pages 345-374, June.
    6. Thiess Buettner & Manuela Krause, 2021. "Fiscal equalization as a driver of tax increases: empirical evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(1), pages 90-112, February.
    7. Köthenbürger, Marko & Egger, Peter & Smart, Michael, 2013. "Do Electoral Rules Make Legislators Differently Responsive to Fiscal Transfers? Evidence from German Municipalities," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79972, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger & Michael Smart, 2010. "Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany," Working Papers 2010/44, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    9. Thiess Buettner & Robert Schwager & Sebastian Hauptmeier, 2011. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper-Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 647-667, December.
    10. Michael Smart, 2007. "Raising taxes through equalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1188-1212, November.
    11. Hindriks, Jean & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. "Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2392-2402, December.
    12. Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2024. "On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(3), pages 856-908, June.
    13. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization," CESifo Working Paper Series 2747, CESifo.
    14. Johannes Becker & Michael Kriebel, 2017. "Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 800-816, September.
    15. Miyazaki, Takeshi, 2016. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Tax Efforts: Evidence from Japan," MPRA Paper 74337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Buettner, Thiess, 2006. "The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 477-497, February.
    17. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2018. "Tax competition and fiscal equalization under corporate income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 311-324, April.
    18. Jean Hindriks & Susana Peralta & Shlomo Weber, 2014. "Local Taxation of Global Corporation: A Simple Solution," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 113-114, pages 37-65.
    19. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld & Sarah Necker, 2017. "Depressing dependence? Transfers and economic growth in the German states, 1975–2005," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(12), pages 1815-1825, December.
    20. HINDRIKS, Jean & PERALTA, Susana & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005. "Fiscal competition, revenue sharing, and policy-induced agglomeration," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal equalization; marginal contribution rates; constitutional reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.