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Universaldienstregulierung in der Telekommunikation heute: Herausforderungen, Chancen und Risiken ; ein historischer Ansatz

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  • Birke, Franziska

Abstract

Die Universaldienstregulierung im Telekommunikationssektor ist ein Beispiel für die Sicherung einer Dienstleistung von allgemeinem Interesse im umfassend für Wettbewerb geöffneten Sektor. Seit der Marktöffnung hat sich der Regulie-rungsprozess grundsätzlich geändert. Mit Hilfe eines historischen Ansatzes wird diese Veränderung dargestellt, um dann zu zeigen, inwiefern sich dadurch neue Chancen und neue Schwierigkeiten für die Universaldienstregulierung ergeben. Anhand dessen werden die europäischen und die deutschen Regeln beurteilt.

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  • Birke, Franziska, 2007. "Universaldienstregulierung in der Telekommunikation heute: Herausforderungen, Chancen und Risiken ; ein historischer Ansatz," Discussion Papers 114, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluivr:114
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    1. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2008. "The fallacies of network neutrality regulation," Discussion Papers 115 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    2. Knieps, Günter, 2010. "The three criteria test, the essential facilities doctrine and the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks," Discussion Papers 132, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    3. Knieps, Günter, 2010. "Network neutrality and the evolution of the internet," Discussion Papers 135, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    4. Knieps, Günter, 2013. "The evolution of the generalized differentiated services architecture and the changing role of the Internet engineering task force," Discussion Papers 147, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    5. Knieps, Günter, 2011. "Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of Internet traffic quality regulation," Discussion Papers 136, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    6. Knieps, Günter, 2014. "Competition and third party access in railroads," Discussion Papers 150, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    7. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2009. "The reform of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications: The unexploited phasing-out potentials," Discussion Papers 128, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    8. Knieps, Günter, 2011. "Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of internet traffic quality regulation," 22nd European Regional ITS Conference, Budapest 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues 52149, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    9. Knieps, Günther, 2010. "Regulatory reforms of European network industries and the courts," Discussion Papers 129 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    10. Knieps, Günter, 2008. "The net neutrality debate and the German communications and competition law," Discussion Papers 120, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.

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