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The different role of mandatory access in German regulation of railroads and telecommunications

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  • Knieps, Günter

Abstract

Network services can be provided efficiently in competitive markets, if nondiscriminatory access to the complementary infrastructure capacities is guaranteed. The sector-symmetric application of the disaggregated regulatory approach to railways and telecommunications reveals the different role of mandatory access. Whereas in telecommunications only the local loop may create a remaining regulatory problem, mandatory access has to be guaranteed with respect to the railway infrastructure as a whole. In spite of the large phasing-out potentials of sector-specific regulation in telecommunications, this sector is still under the burden of overregulation. In contrast, in the railway sector mandatory access has been introduced only recently.

Suggested Citation

  • Knieps, Günter, 2006. "The different role of mandatory access in German regulation of railroads and telecommunications," Discussion Papers 104 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluivr:104r
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    14. Knieps, Günter, 2002. "Wholesale, retail pricing in telecom markets," Discussion Papers 84, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
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    Cited by:

    1. Knieps, Günter, 2013. "The evolution of the generalized differentiated services architecture and the changing role of the Internet engineering task force," Discussion Papers 147, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    2. Knieps, Günter, 2012. "Competition and the railroads: A European perspective," Discussion Papers 142, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    3. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2008. "The fallacies of network neutrality regulation," Discussion Papers 115 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    4. David Besanko & Shana Cui, 2019. "Regulated versus negotiated access pricing in vertically separated railway systems," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 1-32, February.
    5. Knieps, Günter, 2014. "Competition and third party access in railroads," Discussion Papers 150, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    6. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2009. "The reform of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications: The unexploited phasing-out potentials," Discussion Papers 128, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    7. Benjamin Pakula & Georg Götz, 2011. "Organisational Structures in Network Industries – An Application to the Railway Industry," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201109, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    8. Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2013. "Regulatory fallacies in global telecommunications: The case of international mobile roaming," Discussion Papers 144, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    9. Blankart, Charles B. & Knieps, Günter & Zenhäusern, Patrick, 2007. "Regulation of new markets in telecommunications? Market dynamics and shrinking monopolistic bottlenecks," Discussion Papers 112 [rev.], University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.
    10. Knieps, Günter, 2008. "The net neutrality debate and the German communications and competition law," Discussion Papers 120, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.

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