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Ramsey Waits: A Theory of Non-Exclusive Real Options with First-Mover Advantages

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  • Jacco Thijssen

Abstract

This paper analyses the exercise decision of non-exclusive real options in a two-player setting. A general model of non-exclusive real options, allowing the underlying asset to follow any strong Markov process is developed, thus extending the existing literature, which is mainly based on one-dimensional geometric Brownian motion. For games with a first-mover advantage it is proved that an equilibrium with the rent-equalisation property exists. As an example, a duopoly where two firms can adopt a new technology, whose profitability follows a two-dimensional, correlated geometric Brownian motion is studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacco Thijssen, 2007. "Ramsey Waits: A Theory of Non-Exclusive Real Options with First-Mover Advantages," Discussion Papers 07/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:07/17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thijssen, Jacco J.J., 2008. "Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversification," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1701-1720, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Timing games; real options; rent equalisation; technology adoption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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