Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition
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References listed on IDEAS
- Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Miravete, Eugenio, 2003. "Competitive Non-Linear Pricing in Duopoly Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, April.
- Wilson, Robert, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195115826.
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- Grajek, Michal & Kretschmer, Tobias, 2009.
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- Michal Grajek & Tobias Kretschmer, 2006. "Usage and Diffusion of Cellular Telephony, 1998-2004," Working Papers 06-21, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006.
- Michal Grajek & Tobias Kretschmer, 2007. "Usage and diffusion of cellular telephony, 1998-2004," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-07-003, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
- Michal Grajek & Tobias Kretschmer, 2006. "Usage and Diffusion of Cellular Telephony, 1998-2004," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-20, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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- Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination," Working Papers hal-00243025, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre Dubé & K. Sudhir & Andrew Ching & Gregory Crawford & Michaela Draganska & Jeremy Fox & Wesley Hartmann & Günter Hitsch & V. Viard & Miguel Villas-Boas & Naufel Vilcassim, 2005. "Recent Advances in Structural Econometric Modeling: Dynamics, Product Positioning and Entry," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 209-224, December.
- Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2012.
"The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 359-369, February.
- Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 105, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Courty, Pascal & Pagliero, Mario, 2009. "The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 7120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/04, European University Institute.
- Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-27, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Estimation of Equilibrium Oligopoly Models; Competitive Nonlinear Pricing; Common Agency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2004-02-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2004-02-01 (Microeconomics)
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