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Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress

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  • Richard T Boylan

    (Washington University)

Abstract

Staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress increased exponentially from 1940 to 1980, but have remained roughly constant since. A theoretical model of Congressional expenditures, bureaucratic oversight, and congressional ethics is developed to understand historical data. Such a model allows one to define and test a measure of the fraction of Congress that maximizes material rewards (vs. intrinsic rewards of being in office).

Suggested Citation

  • Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9804002
    Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on Sparc ; to print on PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: included
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boylan, R.T., 1997. "Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying," Washington University 97-04, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2008. "Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 331-336, Springer.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
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    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
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    8. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    9. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    10. Lichtenberg, F.R., 1996. "The Effect of New Political Administration on Federal Government Productivity and Employment," Papers 96-11, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
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    12. Becker, Gary S., 1982. "Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Working Papers 23, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    13. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pautler, 2015. "A Brief History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics: Reports, Mergers, and Information Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 59-94, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbying corruption political-economy bureaucracy oversight;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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