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Chain Store Paradoxon

Author

Listed:
  • Elmar Wolfstetter

    (HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY BERLIN-HUB)

  • Brigitte Adolph

    (HUB)

Abstract

In their seminal solution of the chain store paradox Kreps and Wilson assumed that the incumbent monopolist is predisposed, with a small probability, to fight entry. Milgrom and Roberts suggested to view this predisposition to fight as a result of precommitment to an aggressive course of action. However, they did not examine whether such an ability to make commitments is actually chosen by a rational incumbent monopolist. The present paper fills this gap. We assume that the monopolist has access to an appropriate commitment mechanism, with a small probability. Due to the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error, commitments are not perfectly observable. Otherwise, the assumptions of Kreps and Wilson are maintained. These plausible modifications have drastic implications: Precommitment becomes useless, and reputation effects break down; Selten's chain store paradox comes back in full force.

Suggested Citation

  • Elmar Wolfstetter & Brigitte Adolph, 1997. "Chain Store Paradoxon," Microeconomics 9701005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9701005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
    3. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    4. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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