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Anreizprobleme in der Renten- und Krankenversicherung

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  • Börsch-Supan, Axel

    (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

Abstract

Negative Anreizeffekte plagen alle Bereiche der Sozialpolitik. Diese negativen Anreizeffekte beziehen sich auf eine Zurücknahme des Arbeitsangebotes, eine Flucht aus der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung oder der Reduzierung von Ersparnissen. Diese negativen Anreizeffekte werden in diesem Beitrag an zwei Beispielen diskutiert: Der deutschen Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und der deutschen Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, den beiden größten Sozialversicherungskomponenten. Der Beitrag vertieft nicht die theoretische Analyse der Anreizeffekte, sondern untersucht die empirische Relevanz der wirtschaftspolitisch wichtigsten Anreizwirkungen. Dabei werden Anreizeffekte erster Ordnung (Partizipation) und Anreizwirkungen II. Ordnung (moralisches Risiko) unterschieden.

Suggested Citation

  • Börsch-Supan, Axel, 1998. "Anreizprobleme in der Renten- und Krankenversicherung," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-44, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  • Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:98-44
    Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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    Cited by:

    1. Udo Schneider, 2004. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care – the Case of Double Moral Hazard," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 124(2), pages 233-256.

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