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Incentive Effects of Benevolent Intervention - The case of government loan guarantees

Author

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  • Paul K. Chaney

    (Vanderbilt University)

  • Anjan V. Thakor

    (Washington University in St. Louis)

Abstract

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul K. Chaney & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Incentive Effects of Benevolent Intervention - The case of government loan guarantees," Finance 0411047, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411047
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhu, Xiaoquan & Peng, Hongfeng & Zhang, Zijian, 2020. "The nexus of judicial efficiency, social burden and default risk: Cross-country evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Edina Berlinger & Anita Lovas & Péter Juhász, 2017. "State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(4), pages 743-770, December.
    3. William G. Gale, 1987. "The Allocational and Welfare Effects of Federal Credit Programs: A Summary," UCLA Economics Working Papers 460, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Kartik B. Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric Young, 2014. "Loan Guarantees for Consumer Credit Markets," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 297-352.
    5. Duchin, Ran & Sosyura, Denis, 2014. "Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 1-28.
    6. Gao, Jieqiong & Ghosh, Chinmoy, 2024. "The longer-term impact of TARP on banks’ default risk," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 346-357.
    7. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Time-consistent subsidies to unlucky firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 619-634, April.
    8. James D. Hamilton, 2013. "Off-Balance-Sheet Federal Liabilities," NBER Working Papers 19253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Olivier Debande, 1997. "Le rôle du secteur privé dans le financement des infrastructures : une mise en perspective historique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(2), pages 197-230.
    10. Iichiro Uesugi & Koji Sakai & Guy M. Yamashiro, 2006. "Effectiveness of Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market," Discussion papers 06004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    11. Cowan, Kevin & Drexler, Alejandro & Yañez, Álvaro, 2015. "The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 98-110.
    12. Banai, Ádám & Lang, Péter & Nagy, Gábor & Stancsics, Martin, 2020. "Waste of money or growth opportunity: The causal effect of EU subsidies on Hungarian SMEs," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(1).
    13. Shah, Salman & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Optimal capital structure and project financing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 209-243, August.
    14. Alaa Soliman & Mohammad Aliu Momoh & Ibrahim L. Awad, 2017. "Infrastructure Guarantees: Making It Simple," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 178-202.
    15. Wilson, Linus & Wu, Yan Wendy, 2018. "Overpaid CEOs got FDIC debt guarantees," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 101-115.
    16. Linus Wilson & Yan Wu, 2010. "Common (stock) sense about risk-shifting and bank bailouts," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 24(1), pages 3-29, March.
    17. Dailami, Mansoor & Kim, E. Han, 1991. "The effects of debt subsidies on corporate investment behavior," Policy Research Working Paper Series 727, The World Bank.
    18. Soumaré, Issouf & Lai, Van Son, 2016. "An analysis of government loan guarantees and direct investment through public-private partnerships," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 508-519.

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