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The Allocational and Welfare Effects of Federal Credit Programs: A Summary

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  • William G. Gale

    (UCLA)

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  • William G. Gale, 1987. "The Allocational and Welfare Effects of Federal Credit Programs: A Summary," UCLA Economics Working Papers 460, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:460
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp460.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chaney, Paul K. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1985. "Incentive effects of benevolent intervention : The case of government loan guarantees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 169-189, March.
    2. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 455-470.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    4. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-138, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. William G. Gale, 1990. "The Hybrid Plan: A Proposal For Federal Credit Reform," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 107-121, April.
    2. William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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