IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/safiwp/01-04-023.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Stochastic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Anders Eriksson
  • Kristian Lindgren

Abstract

A framework for studying the evolution of cooperative behaviour, using evolution of finite state strategies, is presented. The interaction between agents is modelled by a repeated game with random observable payoffs. The agents are thus faced with a more complex (and general) situation, compared to the Prisoner Õs Dilemma that has been widely used for in- vestigating the conditions for cooperation in evolving populations. Still, there is a robust cooperating strategy that usually evolves in a population of agents. In the cooperative mode, this strategy selects an action that al- lows for maximizing the payoff sum of both players in each round, regard- less of the own payoff. Two such strategies maximize the expected total payoff. If the opponent deviates from this scheme, the strategy invokes a punishment action, which for example could be to aim for the single round Nash equilibrium for the rest of the (possibly infinitely) repeated game. The introduction of mistakes to game actually pushes evolution to more cooperative, even though at first sight, it makes the game more cooperative

Suggested Citation

  • Anders Eriksson & Kristian Lindgren, 2001. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Stochastic Games," Working Papers 01-04-023, Santa Fe Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:01-04-023
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stanley, E. Ann & Ashlock, Dan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1993. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," ISU General Staff Papers 199302010800001028, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, June.
    3. Per Molander, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(4), pages 611-618, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kristian Lindgren, 1996. "Evolutionary Dynamics in Game-Theoretic Models," Working Papers 96-06-043, Santa Fe Institute.
    2. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
    3. , & ,, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    4. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Klein & Sven Rady, 2022. "Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 1948-1992.
    5. Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem," Post-Print hal-00543616, HAL.
    6. Leigh S. Tesfatsion, "undated". "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _057, Society for Computational Economics.
    7. Matsushima Hitoshi, 2020. "Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, January.
    8. Claudius Gräbner & Wolfram Elsner & Alex Lascaux, 2021. "Trust and Social Control: Sources of Cooperation, Performance, and Stability in Informal Value Transfer Systems," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 58(4), pages 1077-1102, December.
    9. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection," ISU General Staff Papers 199505010700001034, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Petros G. Sekeris, 2014. "The tragedy of the commons in a violent world," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 521-532, September.
    11. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
    12. Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017. "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 487-507.
    13. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," ISU General Staff Papers 199807010700001043, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    14. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    15. Esther Hauk, "undated". "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
    16. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009. "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
    17. David Levine, 2000. "The Castle on the Hill," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 330-337, April.
    18. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1029-1042, September.
    20. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001041, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:01-04-023. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epstfus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.