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Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures

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  • Diana Richards
  • Whitman A. Richards
  • Brendan D. McKay

Abstract

An important puzzle in the study of complex systems is the conditions under which the aggregation of information from interacting agents results in a stable or an unstable collective outcome. We present a general framework for thinking about the stability and instability of collective outcomes that focuses on the effects of mutual knowledge. We show that if a complex system of aggregated choice respects a mutual knowledge structure, then the prospects of a stable collective outcome are considerably improved. Our domain-independent results apply to collective choice ranging from perception, where an interpretation of sense data is made by a collection of perceptual modules, to social choice, where a group decision is made from a set of preferences held by individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana Richards & Whitman A. Richards & Brendan D. McKay, 1998. "Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures," Research in Economics 98-04-032e, Santa Fe Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:safire:98-04-032e
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    File URL: http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-04-032.ps
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    2. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    4. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
    5. Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Erratic behavior in economic models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 3-35, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yutaka I. Leon Suematsu & Keiki Takadama & Norberto E. Nawa & Katsunori Shimohara & Osamu Katai, 2003. "Analyzing The Agent-Based Model And Its Implications," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(03), pages 331-347.
    2. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    3. Richards, Diana, 1998. "Mutual knowledge structures and social coordination: a knowledge-induced equilibrium," Bulletins 7478, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    4. John W. Patty, 2008. "Arguments-Based Collective Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 379-414, October.

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