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Arguments-Based Collective Choice

Author

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  • John W. Patty

    (Harvard University, jwpatty@gmail.com)

Abstract

This article presents a model of collective choice when group decisions must be justified by arguments from first principles. Individuals may have preferences over both the actions chosen and the arguments used to justify them. Defining a notion of stability in the arguments made and actions supported within a group, I characterize the set of actions that can be justified as well as the arguments that will be used to justify these actions. Of particular interest in the article is the fact that each individual's preferences over different arguments are endogenously determined by the collection of actions justified by the arguments.

Suggested Citation

  • John W. Patty, 2008. "Arguments-Based Collective Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 379-414, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:4:p:379-414
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093773
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    References listed on IDEAS

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