IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wes/weswpa/2006-019.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Targeting Rules with Intrinsic Persistence and Endogenous Policy Inertia

Author

Listed:
  • Michael S. Hanson

    (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University)

  • Pavel Kapinos

    (Department of Economics, Carleton College)

Abstract

We investigate the optimality of monetary policy targeting rules in a macroeconomic model based on explicit micro-foundations for intrinsic persistence in inflation and real output. For the corresponding social welfare loss function to be minimized by the central bank, inertia arises endogenously in both the inflation and output gap stabilization objectives. In this framework, inflation targeting closely approximates the optimal precommitment policy for empirically relevant parameter values. Alternative policy rules, such as nominal income growth targeting, “speed-limit” targeting, or price level targeting, do not performas well. Previous research has demonstrated lower social welfare losses with these alternative targeting rules; such findings are shown to be primarily a consequence of assuming the central bank minimizes a simple social loss function that is not consistent with the micro-foundations of a model with intrinsic persistence.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael S. Hanson & Pavel Kapinos, 2006. "Targeting Rules with Intrinsic Persistence and Endogenous Policy Inertia," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2006-019, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.wesleyan.edu/pdf/mshanson/2006019_hanson.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Carl Walsh, 2003. "Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 265-278, March.
    3. Motohiro Yogo, 2004. "Estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution When Instruments Are Weak," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 797-810, August.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    5. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2004. "Timeless perspective vs. discretionary monetary policy in forward-looking models," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Mar), pages 43-56.
    6. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1997. "The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 231-296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2007. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 728-752, April.
    8. Robert G. King, 2000. "The new IS-LM model : language, logic, and limits," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 45-103.
    9. Amato, Jeffery D. & Laubach, Thomas, 2003. "Rule-of-thumb behaviour and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 791-831, October.
    10. Cho, Seonghoon & Moreno, Antonio, 2006. "A Small-Sample Study of the New-Keynesian Macro Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(6), pages 1461-1481, September.
    11. Bouakez, Hafedh & Cardia, Emanuela & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2005. "Habit formation and the persistence of monetary shocks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1073-1088, September.
    12. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2005. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
    13. Steinsson, Jon, 2003. "Optimal monetary policy in an economy with inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1425-1456, October.
    14. Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 195-222, October.
    15. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
    16. Rabanal, Pau & Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F., 2005. "Comparing New Keynesian models of the business cycle: A Bayesian approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1151-1166, September.
    17. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 2000. "Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications for Monetary-Policy Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 367-390, June.
    18. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, September.
    19. Marc Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Optimal Inflation-Targeting Rules," NBER Chapters, in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hanson Michael S. & Kapinos Pavel S., 2008. "Endogenous Persistence and the Performance of Inertial Targeting Rules," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-31, March.
    2. Dennis, Richard & Soderstrom, Ulf, 2006. "How Important Is Precommitment for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 847-872, June.
    3. Richard Mash, 2003. "New Keynesian Microfoundations Revisited: A Calvo-Taylor-Rule-of-Thumb Model and Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 174, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Mash, Richard, 2002. "New Keynesian Microfoundations Revisited: A Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model and the Desirability of Inflation vs. Price Level Targeting," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 138, Royal Economic Society.
    5. Gregory E. Givens, 2012. "Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(6), pages 1033-1061, September.
    6. repec:bla:manchs:v:70:y:2002:i:0:p:55-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Gbaguidi, David, 2012. "La courbe de Phillips : temps d’arbitrage et/ou arbitrage de temps," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(1), pages 87-119, mars.
    8. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October.
    9. Duncan, Alfred J. M. & Nolan, Charles, 2019. "Disputes, debt and equity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    10. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2014. "An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-04, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    11. Gregory Erin Givens, 2006. "Revisiting the Delegation Problem in a Sticky Price and Wage Economy," Working Papers 200601, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
    12. Chengsi Zhang & Denise R. Osborn & Dong Heon Kim, 2008. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 667-699, June.
    13. Fair, Ray C., 2007. "Evaluating Inflation Targeting Using a Macroeconometric Model," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 1, pages 1-52.
    14. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2014. "An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-04, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    15. Givens, Gregory E., 2009. "Which price level to target? Strategic delegation in a sticky price and wage economy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 685-698, December.
    16. Ray C. Fair, 2006. "Evaluating Inflation Targeting Using a Macroeconometric Model," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000303, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Michael Paetz, 2007. "Robust Control and Persistence in the New Keynesian Economy," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 20711, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
    18. Richard Mash, 2002. "Monetary Policy with an Endogenous Capital Stock when Inflation is Persistent," Economics Series Working Papers 108, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    19. Federico Di Pace & Matthias Hertweck, 2019. "Labor Market Frictions, Monetary Policy, and Durable Goods," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 32, pages 274-304, April.
    20. Bilbiie, Florin O., 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 63-78.
    21. Ida, Daisuke & Okano, Mitsuhiro, 2023. "Optimal monetary policy delegation in a small-open new Keynesian model with robust control," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Habit formation; inflation persistence; targeting rules; time consistency; institutional design of monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manolis Kaparakis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edwesus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.