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Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?

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  • Keefer, Philip

Abstract

This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Keefer, Philip, 2005. "Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3594, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3594
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    Cited by:

    1. Razvan Vlaicu, 2008. "Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 371-406, October.
    2. Kimana Zulueta†Fülscher, 2018. "Overcoming the ownership dilemma: Contributing to peace and democracy in El Salvador and the Philippines," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(S1), pages 220-246, March.
    3. Dimitris K Christopoulos & Gregorios Siourounis & Irene Vlachaki, 2016. "Democratic Reforms, Foreign Aid and Production Inefficiency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(3), pages 363-389, June.
    4. Izabela Jedrzejowska-Schiffauer & Peter Schiffauer & Gratiela Georgiana Noja, 2020. "Economic Actors and the Problem of Externalities: Could Financial Markets Play a Role in Democratic Backsliding?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1), pages 215-238.
    5. Toke Aidt & Zareh Asatryan & Lusine Badalyan & Friedrich Heinemann, 2020. "Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 409-425, July.
    6. Vollmer, Sebastian & Ziegler, Maria, 2009. "Political Institutions and Human Development Does Democracy Fulfill its 'Constructive' and 'Instrumental' Role?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4818, The World Bank.
    7. Aisling Lyon, 2014. "Challenges to Municipal Fiscal Autonomy in Macedonia," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 44(4), pages 633-658.
    8. Kapstein, Ethan & Converse, Nathan, 2006. "The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance," MPRA Paper 553, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Tavares, Samia Costa, 2007. "Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corruption?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1053-1076, December.
    10. Ethan Kapstein & Nathan Converse, 2006. "The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance," Working Papers 85, Center for Global Development.
    11. del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Governance, social infrastructure and productivity," MPRA Paper 86245, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2018.
    12. Sue, Eddie D.W. & Wong, Wei-Kang, 2010. "The political economy of housing prices: Hedonic pricing with regression discontinuity," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 133-144, June.
    13. Sansia Blackmore & Renee van Eyden, 2020. "A Sequence to Reverse Poverty: Institutions, State Capacity and Human Empowerment," Working Papers 202080, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    14. Robert Elgie & Iain McMenamin, 2008. "Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 255-267, September.
    15. Brian Levy, 2007. "Governance Reform : Bridging Monitoring and Action," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6742.
    16. Stephen Kaplan, 2016. "Fighting Past Economic Wars: Crisis and Austerity in Latin America," Working Papers 2015-13, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    17. Milan Žák & Petr Vymětal, 2006. "Institucionální aspekty nové komparativní ekonomie: ČR a EU [Institutional aspects of new comparative economy: Czech republic and European union]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(5), pages 583-609.
    18. Ivanenko, Vlad, 2005. "Markets and democracy in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2005, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    19. Stephan Kaplan, 2016. "partisan Technocratic Cycles in Latin America," Working Papers 2016-28, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.

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    Keywords

    National Governance; Parliamentary Government; Politics and Government; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research;
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