Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?
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- Lindert, Peter H., 2003. "Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 315-350, June.
- Peter Lindert, 2003. "Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?," Working Papers 64, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2003-06-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2003-06-16 (Development)
- NEP-PBE-2003-06-16 (Public Economics)
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