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GATT experience with safeguards - making economic and political sense of the possibilities that the GATT allows to restrict imports

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  • Finger, J. Michael

Abstract

Realizing that trade liberalization would require periodic adjustments because of problems in particular industries, GATT's framers provided that tariff reductions that led to such problems could be renegotiated; in an emergency a country could raise its tariff first and negotiate compensation with the principal exporting countries later. GATT lists many provisions that allow import restrictions, provisions that, over time, have proven quite fungible. Renegotiations were replaced by negotiated quantitative restraints (VERs), which were replaced by antidumping. The problem (troublesome imports) was always the same, but the instruments changed. And none of the instruments made much political or economic sense. They did not help a government isolate those import restrictions for which the benefits to the domestic economy would exceed the costs. And politically, the procedures through which renegotiations, VERs, or antidumping actions are decided provide a public tribune for interests that would benefit from protection but provide no voice for domestic interests thatwould bear the costs of restricted access to imports. The author offers guidelines for a safeguards process that makes more economic and political sense: A) Identify the costs and losers as well as the benefits and winners. B) Be clear that the action is an exception to the principles underlying the liberalization program. Emphasize that too many such exceptions would constitute abandonment of the liberalization program and its benefits. Included in the investigation process should be an expression of the costs the proposed restriction would impose. C) Don't sanctify the criteria for the action. Procedures should not presume, as antidumping does, that there is some good reason for granting exceptions. Providing a list of good reasons invites protection-seekers to demonstrate that they qualify and places the government in the position of having to demonstrate that they do not. Procedures should stress that the function of the review is to identify the benefits, costs, and domestic winners and losers from the action requested.

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, J. Michael, 1998. "GATT experience with safeguards - making economic and political sense of the possibilities that the GATT allows to restrict imports," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2000, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2000
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oecd, 1996. "Trade and Competition: Frictions after the Uruguay Round," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 165, OECD Publishing.
    2. Finger, J. Michael & Fung, K.C. & DEC, 1993. "Will GATT enforcement control antidumping?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1232, The World Bank.
    3. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1994. "Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 77, April.
    4. Martin, W. & Winters, L.A., 1995. "The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries," World Bank - Discussion Papers 307, World Bank.
    5. Martin,Will & Winters,L. Alan (ed.), 1996. "The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521586016, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tadashi Ito, 2007. "NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US," IHEID Working Papers 26-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 27 Nov 2007.
    2. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2006. "Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 133-163, September.
    3. Araújo, José Tavares de, 2001. "Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy," Comercio Internacional 4355, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    4. World Bank, 2003. "Nepal : Trade and Competitiveness Study," World Bank Publications - Reports 14417, The World Bank Group.

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