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Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy

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  • Araújo, José Tavares de

Abstract

Introduction The interaction between antidumping and antitrust is a polemic issue in every integration process for both legal and economic reasons. From a legal perspective, antidumping rules allow practices such as price undertakings and quantitative trade restrictions that are forbidden by competition law, and punish certain types of price differentiation that are justifiable under the antitrust rules. From an economic viewpoint, the two policies pursue different objectives that eventually may lead to conflicting situations. Antidumping is a trade remedy for industries injured by import competition. The final goal of antitrust is to promote consumer welfare and productive efficiency, which in part depend upon market contestability, wherein import competition often plays a key role. This paper addresses several issues from three complementary perspectives. Section 2 summarizes the current debate about antidumping rules in the United States. This debate includes a large and growing academic literature that has been surveyed recently by Blonigen and Prusa (2001), papers and speeches by influential personalities such as Kenneth Dam, Alan Greenspan and Joseph Stiglitz, and the active participation of business associations, lawyers, lobbyists and politicians. This diverse collection of policy suggestions provides a normative background for the discussion in the rest of the paper. Section 3 reviews the instruments used by the European Union and the U.S. government for reconciling a strong enforcement of competition laws with an intense use of antidumping measures. Section 4 highlights some peculiarities of the FTAA process. Section 5 presents the main conclusions.

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  • Araújo, José Tavares de, 2001. "Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy," Comercio Internacional 4355, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col025:4355
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    1. Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 2, pages 1-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Dam, Kenneth W., 2001. "The Rules of the Global Game," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226134932, December.
    3. P. J. Lloyd & Kerrin M. Vautier, 1999. "Promoting Competition in Global Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1483.
    4. Patrick Messerlin & Mathew Tharakan, 1999. "The Question of Contingent Protection," Post-Print hal-03416493, HAL.
    5. Finger, J. Michael, 1998. "GATT experience with safeguards - making economic and political sense of the possibilities that the GATT allows to restrict imports," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2000, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuwayama, Mikio, 2005. "Latin American South-South integration and cooperation: from a regional public goods perspective," Comercio Internacional 4390, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Izam, Miguel, 2003. "Rules of origin and trade facilitation in preferential trade agreements in Latin America," Comercio Internacional 4370, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. Marconini, Mario A., 2006. "Services in regional agreements between Latin American and developed countries," Comercio Internacional 4414, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    4. Feinberg, Robert M., 2006. "Exploring the patterns and determinants of U.S. antidumping actions against Latin American imports, 1980-2004," Comercio Internacional 4422, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    5. Sáez, Sebastián, 2005. "Implementing trade policy in Latin America: the cases of Chile and Mexico," Comercio Internacional 4396, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    6. Pérez Caldentey, Esteban, 2005. "Export promotion policies in CARICOM: main issues, effects and implications," Comercio Internacional 4398, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    7. Sáez, Sebastián, 2005. "Trade in services negotiations: a review of the experience of the United States and the European Union in Latin America," Comercio Internacional 4403, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    8. Durán Lima, José Elías & Kuwayama, Mikio & Silva, Verónica, 2005. "Bilateralism and regionalism: re-establishing the primacy of multilateralism a Latin American and Caribbean perspective," Comercio Internacional 4401, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    9. Sáez, Sebastián, 2005. "Trade policy making in Latin America: a compared analysis," Comercio Internacional 4397, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).

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