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Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities and Bargaining Solutions

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Abstract

We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash Bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to household decision-making in the context of the Rotten Kid Theorem and in evaluating a change in family taxation.

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  • Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2009. "Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities and Bargaining Solutions," Department Discussion Papers 0903, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    • Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0903
    Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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    Cited by:

    1. Elisabeth Gugl & Linda Welling, 2017. "Efficiency of Family Bargaining Models with Renegotiation: The Role of Transferable Utility across Periods," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(1), pages 53-83, June.
    2. Elisabeth Gugl & Linda Welling, 2012. "Time with sons and daughters," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 277-298, June.
    3. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    4. Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2015. "The Rotten Kid Theorem and Almost Transferable Utility," CESifo Working Paper Series 5642, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Axiomatic bargaining; Solidarity; Transferable utility; Family taxation; Rotten Kid Theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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