IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/usi/wpaper/417.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On Game Formats and Chu Spaces

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

It is argued that virtually all coalitional, strategic and extensive game formats as currently employed in the extant game-theoretic literature may be presented in a natural way as discrete nonfull or even-under a suitable choice of morphisms- as full subcategories of Chu (Poset 2).

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2004. "On Game Formats and Chu Spaces," Department of Economics University of Siena 417, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:417
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/417.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Selten, Reinhard & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 138-152, January.
    3. Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
    4. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
    5. Andjiga, N G & Moulen, J, 1989. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for l-Stability of Games in Constitutional Form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(1), pages 91-110.
    6. Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2003. "On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 243-260, December.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Abdou, Joseph, 2010. "A stability index for local effectivity functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 306-313, May.
    2. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    3. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core," Working Papers 1817, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    5. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    6. Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2009. "Interaction sheaves on continuous domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 708-719, December.
    7. Joseph M. Abdou, 2009. "The Structure of Unstable Power Systems," Post-Print halshs-00392515, HAL.
    8. Joseph Abdou, 2012. "Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 775-789, November.
    9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00633589 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 462-487, May.
    11. Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2024. "The reciprocity set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    12. Bezalel Peleg & Ariel Procaccia, 2010. "Implementation by mediated equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 191-207, March.
    13. Stefano Vannucci, 2007. "Game Formats As Chu Spaces," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 119-138.
    14. Joseph M. Abdou, 2008. "Stability Index of Interaction forms," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00347438, HAL.
    15. Stefano vannucci, 2012. "Finite ß-Playable Effectivity Functions," Department of Economics University of Siena 669, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    16. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    17. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics.
    18. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
    19. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    20. Stefano Vannucci, 2006. "On Concept Lattices of Efficiently Solvable Voting Protocols," Department of Economics University of Siena 489, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    21. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1997. "The Logic of Belief Persistence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 39-59, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fabrizio Becatti (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/desieit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.