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The effect of local monitoring on nuclear safety and compliance: Evidence from France

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  • Bizet, Romain
  • Bonev, Petyo
  • Leveque, Francois

Abstract

We estimate the effect of local monitoring and information disclosure on safety and compliance with self-reporting standards in the French nuclear sector. We use a novel dataset on deviations from safety, radiological and environmental standards recorded in the French nuclear fleet since 1978. We find that while local monitoring and information increases significantly compliance, it has little or no direct effect on safety.

Suggested Citation

  • Bizet, Romain & Bonev, Petyo & Leveque, Francois, 2020. "The effect of local monitoring on nuclear safety and compliance: Evidence from France," Economics Working Paper Series 2014, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2020:14
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    File URL: http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-2014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monitoring; compliance; safety regulation; reporting; cuclear safety;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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