How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union
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Cited by:
- Josep M. Colomer, 2009.
"On Building the American and the European Empires,"
Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs)
6, London School of Economics / European Institute.
- Josep M. Colomer, 2010. "On Building the American and the European Empires," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 06, European Institute, LSE.
- Colomer, Josep M., 2009. "On building the American and the European empires," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 53363, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
Keywords
Political parties; coalitions; power indices; political institutions; European Union;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2000-08-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2000-08-02 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2000-08-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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