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Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision: Receiving more, expecting less?

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  • Prisca Jöst
  • Ellen Lust

Abstract

Are candidates who hand out clientelistic goods at election time less likely to provide services once they take office? This paper examines the poor's expectations of future service provision by candidates who hand out money and other goods versus those who do not. We hypothesize that the poor's expectations should depend on the density of social ties. To test this hypothesis, we use hierarchical models to analyse observational data and two conjoint experiments embedded in a unique survey of Kenyans, Malawians, and Zambians.

Suggested Citation

  • Prisca Jöst & Ellen Lust, 2021. "Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision: Receiving more, expecting less?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-138, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leight, Jessica & Foarta, Dana & Pande, Rohini & Ralston, Laura, 2020. "Value for money? Vote-buying and politician accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    vote-buying; Clientelism; Social cohesion; Poverty; Service delivery;
    All these keywords.

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