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How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums

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  • AUERBACH, ADAM MICHAEL
  • THACHIL, TARIQ

Abstract

Conventional models of clientelism often assume poor voters have little or no choice over which local broker to turn to for help. Yet communities in many clientelistic settings are marked by multiple brokers who compete for a following. Such competition makes client choices, and the preferences guiding such choices, pivotal in fueling broker support. We examine client preferences for a pervasive broker—slum leaders—in the context of urban India. To identify resident preferences for slum leaders, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 residents across 110 slums in two Indian cities. Contra standard emphases on shared ethnicity, we find residents place heaviest weight on a broker's capability to make claims on the state. A survey of 629 slum leaders finds client-preferred traits distinguish brokers from residents. In highlighting processes of broker selection, and the client preferences that undergird them, we underscore the centrality of clients in shaping local brokerage environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Auerbach, Adam Michael & Thachil, Tariq, 2018. "How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 775-791, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:04:p:775-791_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergiu Gherghina & Clara Volintiru, 2023. "Budgetary Clientelism and Decentralization in Hungary and Romania," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 39(1), pages 40-62, March.
    2. Bardhan, Pranab, 2022. "Clientelism and governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    3. Rajkamal Singh & Rahul Hemrajani, 2018. "Concentric Clientelism: A Case Study of Rural Saharanpur," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 247-266, December.
    4. Paniagua, Victoria, 2022. "When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Charles Crabtree & John B. Holbein & J. Quin Monson, 2022. "Patient traits shape health-care stakeholders’ choices on how to best allocate life-saving care," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(2), pages 244-257, February.
    6. Prisca Jöst & Ellen Lust, 2021. "Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision: Receiving more, expecting less?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-138, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Wong, Jason Chun Yu & Blankenship, Brian & Urpelainen, Johannes & Ganesan, Karthik & Bharadwaj, Kapardhi & Balani, Kanika, 2021. "Perceptions and acceptability of electricity theft: Towards better public service provision," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    8. TANAKA Ayumu & ITO Banri & JINJI Naoto, 2022. "Individual Preferences Toward Inward Foreign Direct Investment: A Conjoint Survey Experiment," Discussion papers 22005, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    9. Rajeshwari Deshpande & Louise Tillin & K.K. Kailash, 2019. "The BJP’s Welfare Schemes: Did They Make a Difference in the 2019 Elections?," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 219-233, December.
    10. Han Il Chang, 2021. "A side effect of a broker's expertise in clientelism: A lab‐experimental study," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 393-410, July.
    11. YuJung Julia Lee & Tiffany Radcliff, 2021. "Community interactions and sanitation use by the urban poor: Survey evidence from India’s slums," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 58(4), pages 715-732, March.
    12. Troncone, Massimo & Valli, Roberto, 2024. "Who Pays for the Church? Political Connections and Religious Clientelism in Post-War Italy," OSF Preprints nsyc3, Center for Open Science.
    13. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2022. "Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 483-506, December.
    14. Garay, Candelaria & Palmer-Rubin, Brian & Poertner, Mathias, 2020. "Organizational and partisan brokerage of social benefits: Social policy linkages in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    15. Chidambaram, Soundarya, 2020. "How do institutions and infrastructure affect mobilization around public toilets vs. piped water? Examining intra-slum patterns of collective action in Delhi, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    16. Auerbach, Adam Michael & Thachil, Tariq, 2021. "How does Covid-19 affect urban slums? Evidence from settlement leaders in India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    17. Nunnari, Salvatore & Nichter, Simeon, 2019. "Declared Support and Clientelism," CEPR Discussion Papers 13460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Jöst, Prisca & Lust, Ellen, 2022. "Receiving more, expecting less? Social ties, clientelism and the poor’s expectations of future service provision," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    19. Ward Berenschot, 2020. "Patterned pogroms: Patronage networks as infrastructure for electoral violence in India and Indonesia," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(1), pages 171-184, January.
    20. Mahvish Shami, 2024. "What Do Brokers Provide for Urban Slums?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(5), pages 2252-2269, July.
    21. Hofer, Katrin & Wicki, Michael & Kaufmann, David, 2024. "Public support for participation in local development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    22. Grossman, Shelby & C. Holland, Alisha, 2023. "The collusion trap: Theory with evidence from informal markets in Lagos, Nigeria," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).

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