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(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund

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  • HARRIS, J. ANDREW
  • POSNER, DANIEL N.

Abstract

We leverage innovative spatial modeling techniques and data on the precise geo-locations of more than 32,000 Constituency Development Fund (CDF) projects in Kenya to test whether Members of Parliament (MPs) reward their supporters. We find only weak evidence that MPs channel projects disproportionately to areas inhabited by their political allies, once we control for other factors that affect where projects are placed, such as population density, poverty rates, ethnic demographics, and distance to paved roads. Notwithstanding this result, we find evidence for cross-constituency variation in political targeting, driven in large part by the spatial segregation of the MP’s supporters and opponents. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom about the centrality of clientelistic transfers in Africa and underscore how local conditions generate particular incentives and opportunities for the strategic allocation of political goods. We also highlight the benefits and challenges of analyzing allocations at the project level rather than aggregated to the administrative unit.

Suggested Citation

  • Harris, J. Andrew & Posner, Daniel N., 2019. "(Under What Conditions) Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 123-139, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:01:p:123-139_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Ochieng' Opalo, Ken, 2022. "Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Prisca Jöst & Ellen Lust, 2021. "Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision: Receiving more, expecting less?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-138, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Jeremy Bowles & Benjamin Marx, 2022. "Turnover and Accountability in Africa's Parliaments," Working Papers hal-03873800, HAL.
    4. Bharathi, Naveen & Malghan, Deepak & Mishra, Sumit & Rahman, Andaleeb, 2024. "Status inequality and public goods," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    5. Alexander Maas & Liang Lu, 2021. "Elections have Consequences: Partisan Politics may be Literally Killing Us," Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 45-56, January.
    6. Maas, Alexander S. & Lu, Liang, 2020. "“Elections have Consequences”: Partisan Politics are Literally Killing Us," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304457, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Ferree, Karen E. & Gibson, Clark C. & Long, James D., 2021. "Mixed records, complexity, and ethnic voting in African elections," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    8. Harris, J. Andrew & van der Windt, Peter, 2023. "Empowering women or increasing response bias? Experimental evidence from Congo," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    9. Baldwin, Kate & Karlan, Dean & Udry, Christopher & Appiah, Ernest, 2023. "How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    10. Dyzenhaus, Alex, 2021. "Patronage or policy? The politics of property rights formalization in Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    11. Jöst, Prisca & Lust, Ellen, 2022. "Receiving more, expecting less? Social ties, clientelism and the poor’s expectations of future service provision," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    12. Harris, J. Andrew & Posner, Daniel N., 2022. "Does decentralization encourage pro-poor targeting? Evidence from Kenya’s constituencies development fund," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    13. Line Kuppens & Lucas Leopold & Arnim Langer, 2024. "Group Self‐Interest vs. Equity: Explaining Support for Horizontal Redistribution in (Former) Competitive Clientelist States," Social Inclusion, Cogitatio Press, vol. 12.

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