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Land Acquisition for Industrialization and Compensation of Displaced Farmers

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  • Maitreesh Ghatak
  • Dilip Mookherjee

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated. Prior to acquisition, the farmers are leasing in land from a landlord, either a private owner or a local government. There are three sets of relevant incentive effects in the model: the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer, and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural quality of the land.

Suggested Citation

  • Maitreesh Ghatak & Dilip Mookherjee, 2011. "Land Acquisition for Industrialization and Compensation of Displaced Farmers," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2011-035, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2011-035
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2011-035.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compensation management; Industrialization; Land tenure; Land use; Right of property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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