IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/iastwp/30835.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Government Expropriation Increases Economic Growth and Racial Inequality: Evidence from Eminent Domain

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Daniel L.
  • Yeh, Susan

Abstract

Is it justified for states to appropriate private property rights? If so, should governments expropriate or regulate?We test three conventional views: insecure property rights cause underinvestment, moral hazard cause overinvestment, or public use cause economic growth.We embed these mechanisms in a model and measure them using the random assignment of U.S. federal court judges setting geographicallylocal precedent. For a half-century, racial minority Democrats were more likely to strike down government appropriations while Republican former federal prosecutors were more likely to uphold them. We find that pro-government physical takings precedent stimulated subsequent takings, expropriation of larger parcels, highway construction, and growth in construction, transportation, and government sectors as well as agriculture, retail, and financial sectors, overall economic growth, and property values. However, racial minorities were increasingly displaced, unemployed, and living in public housing, and the service sector declined. Pro-government regulatory takings precedent also spurred economic growth and property values, but did not increase displacement or racial inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Daniel L. & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "Government Expropriation Increases Economic Growth and Racial Inequality: Evidence from Eminent Domain," IAST Working Papers 16-46, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:iastwp:30835
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://iast.fr/pub/30835
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://iast.fr/sites/default/files/wp/government_expropriation_increases_economic_growth_and_racial_inequality.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Angus Deaton, 2010. "Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 424-455, June.
    2. Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, 2010. "Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 175-201, June.
    3. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
    4. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    6. Richard Hornbeck, 2010. "Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(2), pages 767-810.
    7. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Evolution of Common Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(1), pages 43-68.
    8. Taryn Dinkelman, 2011. "The Effects of Rural Electrification on Employment: New Evidence from South Africa," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3078-3108, December.
    9. Bullock, John G., 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 496-515, August.
    10. Waldfogel, Joel, 1995. "The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 229-260, April.
    11. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2011. "Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 651-697.
    12. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    13. Chen, Daniel L. & Prescott, J.J., 2016. "Implicit Egoism in Sentencing Decisions: First Letter Name Effects with Randomly Assigned Defendants," TSE Working Papers 16-726, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    14. Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 103-126, October.
    15. Guangzhong Cao & Changchun Feng & Ran Tao, 2008. "Local “Land Finance” in China's Urban Expansion: Challenges and Solutions," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 16(2), pages 19-30, March.
    16. Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, 2009. "Testing O’Connor and Thomas: Does the Use of Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 46(11), pages 2447-2461, October.
    17. Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark, 2015. "Patents and cumulative innovation: causal evidence from the courts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61614, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    19. Chen, Daniel L. & Cui, Xing & Shang, Lanyu & Zheng, Junchao, 2016. "What Matters: Agreement Between U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges," TSE Working Papers 16-747, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    20. Sandeep Baliga & Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff, 2013. "Polarization and Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 3071-3083, December.
    21. A. Belloni & D. Chen & V. Chernozhukov & C. Hansen, 2012. "Sparse Models and Methods for Optimal Instruments With an Application to Eminent Domain," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(6), pages 2369-2429, November.
    22. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, 2010. "An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 811-846, December.
    23. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
    24. Enrico Moretti, 2014. "Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies, and the Big Push: 100 Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authority," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(1), pages 275-331.
    25. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288.
    26. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2013. "Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1797-1829, August.
    27. Field, Erica Marie, 2005. "Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums," Scholarly Articles 3634150, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    28. Chen, Daniel L. & Halberstam, Yosh & Yu, Alan, 2016. "Covering: Mutable Characteristics and Perceptions of (Masculine) Voice in the U.S. Supreme Court," IAST Working Papers 16-38, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Feb 2020.
    29. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2014. "Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 951-971, August.
    30. Innes, Robert, 1997. "Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 403-432, October.
    31. Ashenfelter, Orley & Eisenberg, Theodore & Schwab, Stewart J, 1995. "Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 257-281, June.
    32. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    33. Emi Nakamura & J?n Steinsson, 2014. "Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence from US Regions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 753-792, March.
    34. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    35. Matias Busso & Jesse Gregory & Patrick Kline, 2013. "Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Place Based Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 897-947, April.
    36. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
    37. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    38. Jonathan P. Kastellec, 2013. "Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 167-183, January.
    39. Carlos Berdejó & Daniel L. Chen, 2017. "Electoral Cycles among US Courts of Appeals Judges," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 479-496.
    40. William J. Collins & Katharine L. Shester, 2013. "Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the United States," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 239-273, January.
    41. Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2016. "Paving Streets for the Poor: Experimental Analysis of Infrastructure Effects," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 254-267, May.
    42. Chen, Daniel L. & Horton, John J., 2016. "Are Online Labor Markets Spot Markets for Tasks?: A Field Experiment on the Behavioral Response to Wage Cuts," TSE Working Papers 16-675, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    43. Chen, Daniel L. & Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2016. "Ideological Perfectionism," IAST Working Papers 16-47, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    44. Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J Bommarito II & Tyler Soellinger & James Ming Chen, 2015. "Law on the Market? Abnormal Stock Returns and Supreme Court Decision-Making," Papers 1508.05751, arXiv.org, revised May 2017.
    45. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, 2011. "The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 426-467.
    46. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages 672-694, November.
    47. Yun-chien Chang, 2010. "An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City, 1990-2002," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 201-244, January.
    48. Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, 2008. "Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 713-749, December.
    49. Nathaniel Baum-Snow, 2007. "Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 775-805.
    50. Thomas Barrios & Rebecca Diamond & Guido W. Imbens & Michal Kolesár, 2012. "Clustering, Spatial Correlations, and Randomization Inference," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 107(498), pages 578-591, June.
    51. Robert Jensen, 2007. "The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 879-924.
    52. Erica Field, 2005. "Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 279-290, 04/05.
    53. Joram Mayshar & Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2011. "Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State," Working Papers 002-11, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
    54. Ahmed E. Taha, 2004. "Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-27.
    55. Michael Klarman, "undated". "Brown and Lawrence," University of Virginia John M. Olin Program for Law & Economics Working Paper Series uvalwps-1003, University of Virginia School of Law.
    56. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
    57. Munch, Patricia, 1976. "An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 473-497, June.
    58. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    59. Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2007. "Demographics and Industry Returns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1667-1702, December.
    60. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, 2015. "Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 317-369.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen, Daniel L. & Levonyan, Vardges & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "Policies Affect Preferences: Evidence from Random Variation in Abortion Jurisprudence," IAST Working Papers 16-58, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    2. Chen, Daniel L. & Sethi, Jasmin, 2016. "Insiders, Outsiders, and Involuntary Unemployment: Sexual Harrassment Exacerbates Gender Inequality," IAST Working Papers 16-44, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    3. Chen, Daniel L. & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "How Do Rights Revolutions Occur? Free Speech and the First Amendment," TSE Working Papers 16-705, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. A. Patrick Behrer & Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Andrei Shleifer, 2021. "Securing Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1157-1192.
    5. Chen, Daniel L. & Yeh, Susan, 2022. "How do rights revolutions occur? Free speech and the first amendment," TSE Working Papers 22-1396, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Jo Thori Lind & Daniel Chen, 2016. "The Political Economy Of Beliefs: Why Fiscal And Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-In-Hand," 2016 Meeting Papers 606, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, 2023. "How do rights revolutions occur? Free speech and the first amendment," Working Papers hal-03921964, HAL.
    8. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    9. Carl Kitchens, 2014. "The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 455-466, September.
    10. Davide Cantoni & Noam Yuchtman, 2020. "Historical Natural Experiments: Bridging Economics and Economic History," NBER Working Papers 26754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Subramanian, Arjunan & Kumar, Parmod, 2024. "Property rights, factor allocation and household welfare: Experimental evidence from a land titling program in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    12. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    13. Kerekes, Carrie B. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2008. "Unveiling de Soto's mystery: property rights, capital formation, and development," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 299-325, December.
    14. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    15. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    16. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "The de Soto effect," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25429, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Benjamin Austin & Edward Glaeser & Lawrence Summers, 2018. "Jobs for the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st-Century America," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(1 (Spring), pages 151-255.
    18. Leight, Jessica, 2016. "Reallocating wealth? Insecure property rights and agricultural investment in rural China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 207-227.
    19. Islam, Md. Rabiul & Madsen, Jakob B. & Raschky, Paul A., 2015. "Gold and silver mining in the 16th and 17th centuries, land titles and agricultural productivity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 150-166.
    20. Seitz, Michael & Watzinger, Martin, 2017. "Contract enforcement and R&D investment," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 182-195.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; displacement; regulation; takings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:iastwp:30835. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iasttfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.