IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unu/wpaper/dp2003-63.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Some Welfare Implications of 'Who Goes First?' in WTO Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis

Abstract

We envisage a logical framework to explain why some trade negotiations are delayed because parties differ on who should 'go first'. In our model, there are substantive welfare implications depending on which party sets tariff rates (or subsidies) first in a strategic optimization exercise. When knowledge about cost levels are incomplete or missing, and hence must be guessed with a probability, the chances of conflict regarding who goes first are extremely high in the situation modeled in this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, 2003. "Some Welfare Implications of 'Who Goes First?' in WTO Negotiations," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2003-63, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2003-63
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2003-063.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    2. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2012. "The economics of trade agreements in the linear Cournot delocation model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 32-46.
    3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    4. Basak Bayramoglu & Brian Copeland & Jean-François Jacques, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies [Le commerce international et les subventions à la pêche]," Post-Print hal-02624649, HAL.
    5. Martín Tobal, 2017. "Regulatory Entry Barriers, Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 76-97, February.
    6. Saggi, Kamal & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2005. "The Case for MFN under Asymmetries of Cost and Market Structure," MPRA Paper 76331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Monika Mrazova, 2009. "Trade negotiations when market access matters," Economics Series Working Papers 447, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. Bayramoglu, Basak & Copeland, Brian R. & Jacques, Jean-Francois, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 13-32.
    9. Rabah Amir & Hend Ghazzai & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, 2023. "On the political economy of economic integration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 61-100, July.
    10. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3140-3183, December.
    11. Tanapong Potipiti & Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2019. "Why Does the WTO Prohibit Export Subsidies But Not Import Tariffs?," PIER Discussion Papers 119, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Tobal, Martin, 2011. "Regulatory Entry Barriers and Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6k8954nn, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    13. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 113-128, July.
    14. Collie, David R., 2019. "Trade Wars under Oligopoly: Who Wins and is Free Trade Sustainable?," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2019/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    15. Costinot, Arnaud, 2008. "A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 197-213, May.
    16. Gene M. Grossman, 2016. "The Purpose of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22070, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Filipe Martins & Alberto A. Pinto & Jorge P. Zubelli, 2022. "Welfare–Balanced International Trade Agreements," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, December.
    18. Junlong Chen & Xinran Xie & Chaoqun Sun & Li Lin & Jiali Liu, 2022. "Optimal trade policy and welfare in a differentiated duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3019-3043, October.
    19. Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2018. "An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 2, pages 33-45, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2003-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Siméon Rapin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/widerfi.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.