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The Case for MFN under Asymmetries of Cost and Market Structure

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  • Saggi, Kamal
  • Yildiz, Halis Murat

Abstract

This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the most favored nation (MFN) clause on equilibrium tariffs and welfare when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to market structure as well as production costs. In the model, firms sell differentiated goods and compete in prices. We contrast two policy scenarios: one where the importing country is free to tariff discriminate among exporters and another where it must treat them the same (MFN). Relative to tariff discrimination, MFN benefits low cost (more concentrated) exporters and hurts high cost (less concentrated) ones. While MFN is generally preferable to discrimination from a global welfare perspective, such need not be the case when high cost exporters enjoy greater market power (because they are merged into a single unit) than low cost ones. Under such a situation, if cost differences between exporters are not too large then tariff discrimination favors low cost producers and is welfare preferred to MFN.

Suggested Citation

  • Saggi, Kamal & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2005. "The Case for MFN under Asymmetries of Cost and Market Structure," MPRA Paper 76331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:76331
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76331/1/MPRA_paper_76331.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2018. "An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 2, pages 33-45, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Most Favoured Nation Clause; Price Competition; import tariffs; WTO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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