A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Agreements on Product Standards
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- Costinot, Arnaud, 2008. "A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 197-213, May.
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Keywords
product standards; trade agreements; incomplete contracts; national treatment; mutual recognition;All these keywords.
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