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Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

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  • Embrey, M.S.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Mengel, F.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Peeters, R.J.A.P.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

Abstract

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  • Embrey, M.S. & Mengel, F. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2012. "Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes," Research Memorandum 051, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012051
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2010. "Endogenous participation in charity auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 921-935, December.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2008. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 337-345, Springer.
    4. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
    5. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
    6. Bos, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 262-264, March.
    7. Jeffrey Carpenter & Jessica Holmes & PeterHans Matthews, 2008. "Charity auctions: a field experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 92-113, January.
    8. Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 351-366, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ayse Gül Mermer & Wieland Müller & Sigrid Suetens, 2016. "Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Vienna Economics Papers 1603, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    2. Bos, Olivier, 2016. "Charity auctions for the happy few," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 83-92.
    3. Jones, Matthew T., 2014. "Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 352-366.
    4. Mermer, Ayşe Gül & Müller, Wieland & Suetens, Sigrid, 2021. "Cooperation in infinitely repeated games of strategic complements and substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 1191-1205.
    5. Damianov, Damian S., 2015. "Should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 84-86.

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