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On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games

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  • Berden, C.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2. Copyright Springer 2006
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Berden, C. & Peters, H.J.M., 2005. "On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005030
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2005030
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
    4. repec:bla:econom:v:59:y:1992:i:234:p:161-77 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
    6. Allan Feldman, 1980. "Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 503-509, January.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
    8. Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2006. "Binary effectivity rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 167-181, December.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.
    2. Berden Caroline & Peters Hans, 2008. "On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. M.A.L.M. van Assen & C.C.P. Snijders, 2010. "The effect of nonlinear utility on behaviour in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(3), pages 301-332, August.

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