Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions
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DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013049
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References listed on IDEAS
- Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2010. "Strategic Social Choice," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-13875-1, June.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
- Boros, Endre & Elbassioni, Khaled & Gurvich, Vladimir & Makino, Kazuhisa, 2010. "On effectivity functions of game forms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 512-531, March.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2013-10-18 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-CTA-2014-02-02 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-02-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-10-18 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2014-02-02 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-18 (Microeconomics)
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