The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: balancing credibility and flexibility
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DOI: 10.26481/umamet.1996006
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Other versions of this item:
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union : Balancing credibility and flexibility," Other publications TiSEM f6a15171-b493-42a5-ac41-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "The Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," DELTA Working Papers 95-24, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union : Balancing credibility and flexibility," Discussion Paper 1995-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December.
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- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Discussion Paper 1995-112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1995. "Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation," Other publications TiSEM c0486475-38f7-41fb-9121-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," Other publications TiSEM 0fbf1a55-e07a-447c-8995-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second best world," Other publications TiSEM 9cf95e79-e382-4268-8e4d-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- repec:kap:iaecre:v:11:y:2005:i:1:p:29-38 is not listed on IDEAS
- Paolo Biraschi, "undated". "Searching for the optimal EMU fiscal rule:an ex-post analysis of the SGP reform proposals," Working Papers wp2008-7, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
- Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2001.
"Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?,"
Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
- Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1997. "Long Term Debt and the Political Support for a Monetary Union," Other publications TiSEM ce87feec-a476-404f-90d2-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Thierry Warin, 2004. "Should Europe Get Rid of the Stability and Growth Pact?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0415, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Grzegorz Poniatowski, 2014. "Common Currency and Determinants of Government Bond Risk Premiums," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 6(2), pages 70-87, June.
- Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1997.
"Long Term Debt and the Political Support for a Monetary Union,"
Discussion Paper
1997-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Uhlig, Harald, 1997. "Long Term Debt and the Political Support of a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- André Fourçans & Thierry Warin, 2007.
"Stability and Growth Pact II: Incentives and Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Economic Policy Reform,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 51-62.
- Andre Fourcans & Thierry Warin, 2007. "Stability and Growth Pact II: Incentives and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 51-62.
- Thierry Warin, 2005. "Stability and Growth Pact: An Index to Trigger an Early Warning Earlier?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0502, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Thierry Warin, 2005. "The Hidden Structural Features of the Fiscal Rule: A European Saga," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 11(1), pages 29-38, February.
- Thierry Warin, 2005. "A Note on International Fiscal Policy Practices," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0520, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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