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An Analysis of the Stability Pact

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  • Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Beetsma, R.M.W.J.

Abstract

We analyse the proposed ‘stability pact’ for countries joining a European Monetary Union (EMU). Within EMU shortsighted governments fail to fully internalize the inflationary consequences of their debt policies, which results in excessive debt accumulation. Hence, although in the absence of EMU governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact, within EMU they prefer a stability pact which punishes excessive debt accumulation. With idiosyncratic shocks to governments’ budgets, EMU combined with an appropriately designed stability pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. While the stability pact corrects the average debt bias, inflation, which is attuned to the Union-average debt level, is more stable.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. & Beetsma, R.M.W.J., 1997. "An Analysis of the Stability Pact," Discussion Paper 1997-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:030c82d8-1088-4f22-a337-c57f39c48dcc
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    Cited by:

    1. Anton Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions over the Cycle: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 2002_13, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002.
    2. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2000. "Designing Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0529, Econometric Society.
    3. Harry Huizinga & Søren Bo Nielsen, "undated". "Is Coordination of Fiscal Deficits Necessary?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Bernhard Winkler, 1999. "Co-ordinating Stability: Some Remarks on the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy under EMU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 287-295, September.
    5. Patrizio Tirelli & V. Anton Muscatelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2004. "The interaction of fiscal and monetary policies: some evidence using structural econometric models'," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 103, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    6. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2011. "Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 163-178, February.
    7. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
    8. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 41-62, July.
    9. Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 2006. "The 2005 Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Too Little, Too Late?," Bruges European Economic Research Papers 6, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    10. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March.
    11. Heipertz, Martin, 2003. "The Stability and Growth Pact - Not the best but better than nothing. Reviewing the debate on fiscal policy in Europe's Monetary Union," MPIfG Working Paper 03/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2004. "Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 377-394, January.
    13. Detken, Carsten, 1999. "Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world," Working Paper Series 0003, European Central Bank.
    14. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    15. Marco Catenaro, 2000. "Macroeconomic Policy Interactions in the EMU: A Case for Fiscal Policy Co-ordination," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0003, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stability Pact; European Monetary Union; political distortions; monetary policy; debt policy; inflation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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