IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umagsb/2022007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Gong, Doudou

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Quantitative Economics)

  • Dietzenbacher, Bas

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

  • Peters, Hans

    (RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

Abstract

A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash, and strong equilibria are analyzed for the case where the agents have single-dipped preferences. One of the main results is that when the mechanism is anonymous, monotonic, standard, and order preserving, then the Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and assign Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: members of a maximal coalition prefer an equal coalition share over obtaining zero, whereas the outside agents prefer zero over obtaining an equal share from joining the coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022. "Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022007
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2022007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/97759787/RM22007.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26481/umagsb.2022007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Single-basined choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 162-168.
    2. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    3. Grisel Ayllón & Diego M. Caramuta, 2016. "Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 245-264, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2023. "Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    2. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    3. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    2. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2357-2375.
    5. Dubey, Pradeep & Sondermann, Dieter, 2009. "Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 124-141, January.
    6. Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," DSSR Discussion Papers 111, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    7. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    8. Yi, Jianxin, 2012. "Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 105-107.
    9. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    11. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    12. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 253-279.
    13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(4), pages 575-585, December.
    14. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    15. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Privacy in implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 547-580, March.
    16. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2005. "The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 159-196, February.
    17. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    18. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
    20. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Leonne Portz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.