Report NEP-DES-2022-08-08

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Ayumi Igarashi & Yasushi Kawase & Warut Suksompong & Hanna Sumita, 2022. "Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences," Papers 2206.05879, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
• Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022. "Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
• Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen & Emil Chrisander, 2022. "Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties," Papers 2206.15096, arXiv.org.
• Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann, 2021. "Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: A mechanism design approach," Post-Print hal-03681456, HAL.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022. "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," NBER Working Papers 30189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Xiaoming Cai & Pieter Gautier & Ronald Wolthoff, 2022. "Meetings and Mechanisms," Working Papers tecipa-727, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
• Haris Aziz & Sujit Gujar & Manisha Padala & Mashbat Suzuki & Jeremy Vollen, 2022. "Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting," Papers 2206.05966, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
• Alexei Parakhonyak & Anton Sobolev, 2022. "Persuasion Without Priors," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_359, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.