Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
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DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2014026
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- Jiwoong Lee & Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen, 2019. "Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1033-1054, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-09-08 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-09-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-09-08 (Microeconomics)
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