Firm, Theoru of the (I)
In: The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics
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Cited by:
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014.
"Delegation and dynamic incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- Strausz, Roland & Shin, Dongsoo, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo.
- Kim, Jinyoung, 2017. "Racing against Time in Research: A Study of the 1995 U.S. Patent Law Amendment," IZA Discussion Papers 10815, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2005.
"Modes of Communication,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1217-1238, December.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Modes of Communication," IDEI Working Papers 323, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Modes of communication," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9631, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2018.
"Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(5), pages 1605-1653.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Lemos, Renata & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2013. "Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121789, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2013. "Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58162, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Prat, Andrea & Lemos, Renata & Sadun, Raffaella, 2017. "Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83391, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2013. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 049, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2013. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," CEP Discussion Papers dp1250, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Prat, Andrea & Bandiera, Oriana & Sadun, Raffaella & Lemos, Renata, 2015. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 10379, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2013. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," NBER Working Papers 19722, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Renata Lemos & Raffaella Sadun, 2013. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-044, Harvard Business School, revised Jun 2017.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Lemos, Renata & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2018. "Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84945, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Uwe Jirjahn & Jens Mohrenweiser, 2019.
"Performance Pay and Applicant Screening,"
British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 540-575, September.
- Uwe Jirjahn & Jens Mohrenweiser, 2015. "Performance Pay and Applicant Screening," Research Papers in Economics 2015-11, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
- Jirjahn, Uwe & Mohrenweiser, Jens, 2017. "Performance Pay and Applicant Screening," GLO Discussion Paper Series 47, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Jirjahn, Uwe & Mohrenweiser, Jens, 2017. "Performance Pay and Applicant Screening," IZA Discussion Papers 10643, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Brickley, James A, 1999. "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 745-774, October.
- Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1998. "The Nature of the Farm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 343-386, October.
- Hornstein, Andreas & Krusell, Per & Violante, Giovanni L., 2005.
"The Effects of Technical Change on Labor Market Inequalities,"
Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 20, pages 1275-1370,
Elsevier.
- Andreas Hornstein & Per Krusell & Giovanni L. Violante, 2004. "The effects of technical change on labor market inequalities," Working Paper 04-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Andreas Hornstein & Per Krusell & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "The Effects of Technical Change on Labor Market Inequalities," Working Papers 89, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Hornstein, Andreas & Krusell, Per & Violante, Giovanni L, 2005. "The Effects of Technical Change on Labour Market Inequalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 5025, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Asuyama, Yoko, 2016. "Delegation to workers across countries and industries : social capital and coordination needs matter," IDE Discussion Papers 620, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
- Guadalupe, Maria & Wulf, Julie, 2009. "The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 7253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bengt Holmström, 2017. "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1753-1777, July.
- Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
- Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016.
"Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
- Leonardo Felli & Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2015. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," CESifo Working Paper Series 5343, CESifo.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Amirah El-Haddad, 2013. "Political Patronage and Economic Opportunity: The Case of Vertical Integration in the Egyptian Clothing Industry," Working Papers 797, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2013.
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