Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500086
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bagwell, Kyle, 1995.
"Commitment and observability in games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
- Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998.
"Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April.
- Werner GÜTH & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER & Klaus RITZBERGER, 1995. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Vienna Economics Papers vie9507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series 35, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Werner Güth & Georg Kirchsteiger & Klaus Ritzberger, 1998. "Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5907, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007.
"The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
- Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Morgan, John & Várdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Value of Commitment with Imperfect Observability and Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 555-574, Winter.
- van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997.
"Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1994. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Other publications TiSEM 6904f950-4c18-478b-afa6-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1997. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Other publications TiSEM 98d6e8cb-38a1-4341-b53e-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1994. "Games with imperfectly observable commitment," Discussion Paper 1994-64, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
- Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
- Vardy, Felix, 2004. "The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 374-400, November.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
- Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
- Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2016. "Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 553-570, November.
- Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix, 2007.
"The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 326-338, August.
- Morgan, John & Várdy, Felix, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0s6752rf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2013. "Dynamic Countervailing Power under Public and Private Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 9526, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2013. "The Fragility of Commitment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(6), pages 1344-1353, June.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002.
"Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM fcc97407-becb-465c-9856-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997.
"Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
598, David K. Levine.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Schlag, Karl H., 1997. "Loss of commitment? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,39, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Michael Kopel & Clemens Löffler, 2008. "Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 143-166, July.
- Bhaskar, V, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 8887, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2000.
"Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 174-190, May.
- Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller, 1998. "Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result," Experimental 9804001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020.
"Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Post-Print halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Satoru Takahashi & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875199, HAL.
- Reuben Bearman, 2023. "Signaling Games with Costly Monitoring," Papers 2302.01116, arXiv.org.
- Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006.
"Noisy leadership: An experimental approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October.
- Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, "undated". "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y., 2006. "Noisy leadership : An experimental approach," Other publications TiSEM e4796461-8862-4085-a867-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Christoffel Grechenig & Martin Kolmar, 2011. "The State’s Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
"Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-347, March.
- Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
- Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2013. "Inefficiency As A Strategic Device In Group Contests Against Dominant Opponents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2083-2095, October.
- de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
More about this item
Keywords
Costly leader games; incomplete information; type heterogeneity; sequential games; leader advantage;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:02:n:s0219198917500086. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.