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Peer sanctioning in isomorphic provision and appropriation social dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Ramalingam

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Antonio J. Morales

    (University of Malaga)

  • James M. Walker

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, positive versus negative frames of social dilemmas and the effectiveness of peer sanctioning in promoting cooperation. Examining provision and appropriation games that are strategically and payoff isomorphic, we find evidence of less cooperation in the appropriation game. We also find that peer sanctioning is able to overcome the decrease in cooperation in the appropriation game, leading to greater relative increases in contributions and earnings in that decision setting. This result is linked to the fact that low contributors are targeted for punishment more frequently in the appropriation game. All the experimental findings are compatible with the existence of reciprocal preferences a la Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008).

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2017. "Peer sanctioning in isomorphic provision and appropriation social dilemmas," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-09R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:16-09r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Andreoni, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21.
    2. Esther Blanco & Maria Claudia Lopez & James M. Walker, 2016. "The Opportunity Costs of Conservation with Deterministic and Probabilistic Degradation Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(2), pages 255-273, June.
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    6. Abhijit Ramalingam & Antonio J. Morales & James M. Walker, 2016. "Variation in experimental instructions: Punishment in public goods games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-22R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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    9. James C. Cox & Elinor Ostrom & Vjollca Sadiraj & James M. Walker, 2013. "Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 79(3), pages 496-512, January.
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    1. Ivo Baur & Heinrich H. Nax, 2018. "Adapting Governance Incentives to Avoid Common Pool Resource Underuse: The Case of Swiss Summer Pastures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-20, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social dilemma; experiment; provision; appropriation; cooperation; punishment; reciprocal preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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