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Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990-2009

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Listed:
  • John K. Ashton

    (Bangor Business School)

  • Andrew D. Pressey

    (Birmingham Business School)

Abstract

Although the study of international cartels has a considerable lineage our understanding of their organization, operation and management remains limited. This study attends to this omission through examining the role of marketing and sales managers within international cartels using a content analysis of 56 major international price-fixing cartels over two decades (1990-2009). It is reported that marketing and sales managers are demonstrably involved in many international cartels (42.9% of all cartel cases), albeit often accompanied by more senior managers from other firm functions. Marketing and sales managers appear most frequently within worldwide and manufacturing industry cartels and where market allocation and customer-sharing practices occur. In light of these findings it is important to reassess both managerial attitudes towards inter-firm collaborations and enhance the position of antitrust concerns within business school syllabi.

Suggested Citation

  • John K. Ashton & Andrew D. Pressey, 2012. "Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990-2009," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2012_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2023. "Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(1), pages 376-403.
    2. Daniel Herold, 2017. "Compliance Programs, Signaling and Firms' Internal Coordination," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201749, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Johannes Paha, 2013. "The Impact of Persistent Shocks and Concave Objective Functions on Collusive Behavior," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201328, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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