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Monopoly in the UK: What determines whether the MMC finds against the investigated firms?

Author

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  • Stephen W. Davies
  • Nigel L. Driffield
  • Roger Clarke

Abstract

This paper draws on data from 73 UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission reports on monopoly between 1973 and 1995. It shows that there is a roughly two in three chance that the Commission will come to an adverse conclusion against the investigated firms in a given case. 75–80% of decisions can be explained purely in terms of the market share of the leading firm and knowledge of the broad nature of the alleged anti‐competitive practice. An adverse finding is most likely in cases involving exclusive dealing, and least likely where other vertical restraints are involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen W. Davies & Nigel L. Driffield & Roger Clarke, 1999. "Monopoly in the UK: What determines whether the MMC finds against the investigated firms?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 263-283, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:3:p:263-283
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00101
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcos Avalos & Rafael E. De Hoyos, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 32(2), pages 113-130, March.
    2. Jordi Gual & Núria Mas, 2011. "Industry Characteristics and Anti-Competitive Behavior: Evidence from the European Commission’s Decisions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(3), pages 207-230, November.
    3. John K. Ashton & Andrew D. Pressey, 2007. "The Regulatory Perception of the Marketing Function: an Interpretation of UK Competition Authority Investigations 1950-2005," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Ghosal, Vivek, 2002. "Potential foreign competition in US manufacturing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1461-1489, December.
    5. Philippe Aghion & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt & Susanne Prantl, 2009. "The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 20-32, February.
    6. Callahan, Carolyn M. & Plečnik, James M. & Ryou, Jiwoo, 2024. "Do competitive markets encourage tax aggressiveness?," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    7. Davies, Stephen & Olczak, Matthew & Coles, Heather, 2011. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 221-231, March.
    8. John K. Ashton & Andrew D. Pressey, 2012. "Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990-2009," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    9. Bergman, Mats A. & Jakobsson, Maria & Razo, Carlos, 2005. "An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 717-737, December.
    10. Lauk Martina, 2003. "Ökonometrische Analyse der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundeskartellamtes / Econometric Analysis of the Decisions of the German Federal Cartel Office," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(6), pages 680-711, December.
    11. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak & Heather Coles, 2007. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: evidence from EC merger cases," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-07, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    12. Diego S. Cardoso & Mariusa M. Pitelli & Adelson M. Figueiredo, 2021. "An Econometric Analysis of the Brazilian Merger Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 103-132, August.
    13. Robert Feinberg & Mieke Meurs & Kara Reynolds, 2012. "Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 203-219, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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