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Tax evasion and the cost of public sector activities

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  • Rosella Levaggi

Abstract

This paper examines the effects that tax evasion has on the cost to produce goods and service in an environment where input prices are homogenously taxes, but evasion is intersectorially differentiated. Tax evasion raises the relative cost of producing goods and services in the sectors where evasion is more difficult. Such effects adds a potentially important, but so far neglected, element to the relative cost of goods and services produced by the public sector. The general equilibrium analysis presented in this paper shows the perverse effects of tax evasion which reduces total production (hence total wealth) even in a model where, due to the absence of redistributive effects, tax evasion is simply fiscal illusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosella Levaggi, 2006. "Tax evasion and the cost of public sector activities," Working Papers ubs0616, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Domenico Depalo & Raffaella Giordano, 2011. "The public-private pay gap: a robust quantile approach," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 70(1), pages 25-64, January.
    4. Alessandro Fedele & Paolo M. Panteghini & Sergio Vergalli, 2011. "Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax‐Rate Uncertainty," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(4), pages 438-468, November.
    5. Amedeo Fossati & Rosella Levaggi, 2008. "Delay is not the answer: waiting time in health care & income redistribution," Working Papers 0801, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    6. Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, 2010. "Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Investments Differently from For-profit Firms? The Case of Social Residential Services in Italy," Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 174-189, October.
    7. Del Boca, Alessandra & Fratianni, Michele & Spinelli, Franco & Trecroci, Carmine, 2010. "The Phillips curve and the Italian lira, 1861-1998," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 182-197, August.
    8. Martin Meier & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2014. "Competitive markets with private information on both sides," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 257-280, February.
    9. Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2009. "Decentralized provision of merit and impure public goods," Working Papers 0909, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    10. Francesco Menoncin & Paolo Panteghini, 2009. "Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation in the Real World," CESifo Working Paper Series 2674, CESifo.
    11. Bisin, A. & Geanakoplos, J.D. & Gottardi, P. & Minelli, E. & Polemarchakis, H., 2011. "Markets and contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 279-288.
    12. Alessandro Fedele & Francesco Liucci & Andrea Mantovani, 2009. "Credit availability in the crisis: the European investment bank group," Working Papers 0913, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2008:i:7:p:1-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Sorin Adrian Ciupitu & Daniela Tudorache, 2015. "Fiscal Pressure Causes Major Problems to Romanian Economy: Underground Economy and Corruption," Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 7(1), pages 128-130, March.
    15. Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2008. "Merit goods provision and optimal tax evasion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(7), pages 1-3.
    16. Balázs Hohmann, 2021. "Possibilities for Modernization of Conciliation Board Procedures in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe - Online Dispute Resolution and Electronic Communication," European Journal of Social Sciences Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 4, ejss_v4_i.

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