Adómorál és adórendszer
[Tax morality and progressive wage tax]
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Cited by:
- Sipos, Norbert & Lukovszki, Lívia & Rideg, András & Vörös, Zsófia, 2023. "Az adócsalási hajlandóság empirikus vizsgálata [Willingness to evade tax in Hungary: an empirical analysis]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 192-212.
- Simonovits, András & Vincze, János & Méder, Zsombor Zoltán, 2012. "Adómorál és adócsalás - társadalmi preferenciák és korlátozott racionalitás [Tax morale and tax system: social preferences and bounded rationality]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1086-1106.
- Simonovits, András, 2013. "Egyszerű paternalista transzfermodellek családja [A family of simple paternalistic transfer models]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 402-430.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
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