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Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes

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  • Gregory Amacher
  • Erkki Koskela
  • Markku Ollikainen

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Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Amacher & Erkki Koskela & Markku Ollikainen, 2007. "Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(2), pages 189-211, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:38:y:2007:i:2:p:189-211
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9070-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    2. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    3. Koskela, Erkki, 1983. "A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 127-133, October.
    4. Gregory S. Amacher & Richard J. Brazee & Meindert Witvliet, 2001. "Royalty Systems, Government Revenues, and Forest Condition: An Application from Malaysia," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(2), pages 300-313.
    5. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
    6. R. A. Musgrave & Tun Thin, 1948. "Income Tax Progression, 1929-48," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(6), pages 498-498.
    7. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    8. Grut, M. & Gray, J.A. & Egli, N., 1991. "Forest pricing and concession policies: managing the high forest of west and central Africa," Papers 139a, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    9. Sandmo, Agnar, 2005. "The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 58(4), pages 643-663, December.
    10. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hansen, Christian P. & Lund, Jens F., 2011. "The political economy of timber taxation: The case of Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(8), pages 630-641, October.
    2. Kuusela, O.P. & Amacher, G.S. & Moeltner, K., 23. "Performance Bonds in Tropical Timber Concessions: Encouraging the Adoption of Reduced Impact Logging Techniques," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 44, May.
    3. Amacher, Gregory S. & Ollikainen, Markku & Koskela, Erkki, 2012. "Corruption and forest concessions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 92-104.
    4. Divya Datt, 2016. "Inter-governmental political relations in a federation and illegal mining of natural resources," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 18(4), pages 557-576, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Illegal logging; Royalty progression; Timber concessions; Deforestation; D81; H26; Q23;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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