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Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?

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  • Thomas Liebi

Abstract

Labelling is an increasingly popular way to deal with the problem of non-observability of quality inherent in the consumption of credence goods. I present a model in which the number of labelled products a monopolist offers serves as a signal for the non-observable endogenous quality. An increase in the number of labelled products increases the risk of losing consumer trust by increasing the possibility of detecting wrong labels. This lowers the incentive to produce low quality in the first place.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?," Diskussionsschriften dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    • Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    2. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    3. Luis M.B. Cabral, 2000. "Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 658-673, Winter.
    4. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2001. "On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?," Vienna Economics Papers vie0101, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Jay Pil Choi, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(4), pages 655-669.
    6. Golan, Elise H. & Kuchler, Fred & Mitchell, Lorraine, 2000. "Economics Of Food Labeling," Agricultural Economic Reports 34069, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    7. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
    8. Sullivan, Mary, 1990. "Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella-Branded Products," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(3), pages 309-329, July.
    9. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2001. "On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing," Diskussionsschriften dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    credence goods; labels; product quality; consumer trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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