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Colombian ADRs: Why so few?

Author

Listed:
  • González, Maximiliano

    (School of Management, Universidad de los Andes)

  • Trujillo, María Andréa

    (CESA)

  • Guzmán, Alexander

    (CESA)

Abstract

We address the question of why Colombian companies have had such a limited presence in the ADRs market. Traditional explanations state that investors’ protection and the degree of Colombian economic and financial development increases the costs of entry in the ADRs market. However, in the case of Colombia these explanations do not suffice because in these respects Colombia is no different from other Latin American countries. Using a theoretical model, we show that additional factors such as drug trafficking and armed conflict explain better why Colombian firms have moved away from the ADRs market.

Suggested Citation

  • González, Maximiliano & Trujillo, María Andréa & Guzmán, Alexander, 2009. "Colombian ADRs: Why so few?," Galeras. Working Papers Series 023, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:uac:somwps:023
    as

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    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/46375/Galeras-de-administraci%C3%B3n-23.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. González, Maximiliano & Garay, Urbi, 2012. "Market Segmentation: Venezuelan ADRs," Galeras. Working Papers Series 035, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.
    2. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pombo, Carlos & Trujillo, María Andréa, 2012. "Family involvement and dividend policy in listed and non-listed firms," Galeras. Working Papers Series 034, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.
    3. Pablo, Eduardo & González, Maximiliano & Garay, Urbi, 2013. "Cultural distance and its effect on cross-border entry mode: Latin American evidence," Galeras. Working Papers Series 036, Universidad de Los Andes. Facultad de Administración. School of Management.

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